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Abstract In this paper a framework for empirical analysis is introduced that allows for a
dynamic analysis of the interactions between different types of actors and institutions. We
elaborate our argument by focusing on a complex phenomenon—corporatism—to show how
this concept can be developed into a measure that travels across nations and time. The heu-
ristic framework we developed adequately captures the interactive behaviour of the relevant
actors within a corporatist institutional context. We demonstrate the usefulness of this frame-
work for the analysis of policy formation by applying it to Dutch incomes policy. We contend
that this heuristic framework contributes to alleviating the often discussed methodological
trade-off between single case studies and cross-national comparisons. We also argue that it
can bridge the gap between qualitative and quantitative approaches. Lastly, we propose that
it can be used for empirical analysis of policy-making processes in other policy areas.
Keywords Comparative method · Systematic case analysis · Corporatism · Policy studies ·
Institutional analysis
1 Introduction
One of the perennial dilemmas in comparative politics is the trade-off between comparing
many cases and researching few cases. This trade-off regards the degree of external and
internal validity, and is often considered as a choice between statistical explanation and thick
description (Pennings et al. 2006; Peters 1998; Ragin 1987). Both approaches have their
merits and drawbacks for the comparative method. A comparison of many cases allows for
statistical control, reduces selection bias, has an extensive comparative scope that gener-
ates empirical support for general theory, and identifies deviant cases as a basis for further
research. This type of research also induces parsimonious models of explanatory factors,
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allows for a large number of variables and can rule out rival hypotheses by including control
variables. On the downside there is often need for substantial stretching of concepts to be
able to fit all cases, and it is often not clear what the substantive importance of the findings
exactly is (Landman 2004; Collier and Mahon 1993; Sartori 1970).
Single cases on the other hand allow for thick descriptions that range across many polit-
ical and institutional variables and involve in-depth understanding of the specifics of the
case. Case studies also allow for hypothesis generation, theory confirming and infirming,
the interpretation of deviant cases and historical analysis (Lijphart 1971; Hall 2006). On the
downside it is usually quite difficult to validate the analytical results in a generalising way.
Case based research may also involve implicit comparisons that are derived from and can
only be understood within the (national) context in which the case is developed. Finally, the
theoretical inference of case studies is low vis-à-vis the systematic comparison of multiple
cases (Dogan and Pelassy 1990; Castles 1989; Przeworski 1987).
To overcome this dilemma various research strategies have been suggested. Single case
studies may be used as crucial cases to test theories developed on the basis of comparative
analysis (Yin 1989; Landman 2004); as sources of information (data) for real comparison
(Peters 1998); as points of reference for benchmarking or judging general trends (Pennings
et al. 2006); or as data for comparisons based on Boolean analysis or Fuzzy-set logic (Ragin
2000; Pennings 2003; Vis 2006).
The analytical framework developed in this article is designed to alleviate this methodolog-
ical trade-off between comparing multiple cases and researching a single case by combining
elements of both research strategies: comparing multiple cases derived from a qualitative
description and turning this information into a systematic analysis within a comparative con-
text. The aim is to provide a technique to collect and organize comparable data that can be
analysed across time and across systems yielding valid internal and external results (Bartolini
1993; Mahoney 2000).
The paper is structured as follows. First the concept of corporatism as a government
strategy for conflict regulation will be elaborated. Next the use of this concept in compar-
ative research will be highlighted. Based on this actor oriented approach of corporatism
which is embedded in an institutional arrangement, a heuristic framework will be developed
that can systematically capture the behaviour of the relevant actors involved in corporatist
policy-making: government, trade unions and employers’ organisations. The usefulness of
this heuristic framework will then be demonstrated by applying that framework to selected
cases of the formation and implementation of Dutch incomes policy after 1965.1 The paper
concludes with a discussion of the contribution of this framework to cross-national research
into complex configurations on a system’s level that are hitherto usually represented as
categorical and thus static variables (Brady and Collier 2004).
2 Corporatism: from theoretical concept to empirical observation
Over time scholars have proposed different solutions to relate theoretical ideas on corporat-
ism to empirical observation (e.g., Lijphart and Crépaz 1991; Keman and Pennings 1995;
Siaroff 1999; Vergunst 2004). Measures of corporatist interest representation and interme-
diation as regards public policy-making on socio-economic matters can be distinguished by
the following aspects: the number and behavioural characteristics of the actors involved; the
1 Before 1965, Dutch incomes policy was largely government directed (Windmuller 1969).
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type of scaling techniques used to capture the level of corporatism; and the incorporation of
institutions.
Most indexes on corporatism cover either bipartite or tripartite modes of representa-
tion (the number of actors involved drives the operationalisation). These concern either the
interactions between employers’ organisations and trade unions, or the same actors and the
government. Hence, the distinction between bi- and tripartism implies an important opera-
tional decision as to what is essential for the study of corporatism. The focus is either on
industrial relations as such or on the interdependent relations of the so-called social partners
vis-à-vis the government.
Both types of operationalisation have been developed into nominal and ordinal scales (e.g.,
Western 1991; Czada 1987; Lehmbruch 1984). The problem of these scaling techniques is
that they are static (fixed rank orders over time) and define the interactions between the actors
as more or less structural. A static variable (corporatism) is used to examine a moving target:
concerted socio-economic policy-making within a democratic system that is characterised
by party government and thus can be expected to change over time (e.g., Lijphart 1999,
Chap. 15).
This has led other scholars to score countries over time as regards the degree of central
bargaining, access to institutional arrangements, and rates of conflictual behaviour (strikes)
of the participants. (e.g., Siaroff 1999; Iversen 1999; Traxler et al. 2001; Compston 2003;
Traxler 2004). The problem with these dynamic scales is that the variation over time is lim-
ited to bipartite patterns of behaviour only and therefore the policy-making process is either
assumed to be corporatist or simply absent. They may well measure the relative strength and
presence of the social partners over time, but cannot relate these structural features to their
actual behaviour in the process of policy formation. Although this type of dynamic scaling
to some extent solves the problem of static indicators, it simultaneously creates another: goal
oriented behaviour cannot be incorporated. It indicates the contextual variation of corporatism
rather than the process of intermediation as such (Vergunst 2004).
Most students of corporatism and the related process of policy-making agree that institu-
tions are essential for understanding and have attempted to take these into account. So, the
degree of state involvement is mentioned (e.g., Siaroff 1999; Armingeon 1999); and the role
of party government, in particular of Social Democracy, is taken into account (Woldendorp
2005, 20 ff.). The incorporation of these institutions into the measures of corporatism is,
however, conducive to an almost deterministic view that over time institutions run by the
state (Armingeon, 1994) or social democratic government (Gallagher et al. 2006, p. 444)
determine the working of corporatist intermediation. In this type of elaboration state involve-
ment and party government are considered as primarily effect-producing and corporatism
becomes merely a by-product.
This concise survey demonstrates that the concept of corporatism is frequently opera-
tionalised and measured in a way that that decreases internal validity:
• The number of actors involved drives the operationalisation (bi- or tripartite).
• Static comparative scales are insufficient to analyse corporatist behaviour and related
effects on, for instance, policy agreements; dynamic measures do focus on behavioural
patterns, but without taking into account the related variation of the policy process.
• Institutional arrangements are only indirectly included or are considered to be functionally
dependent on the party in government.
These are serious methodological shortcomings, and have led to many studies which have
made claims with regard to the working of corporatism that are, in our view, empirically
not warranted nor externally valid as regards theory development. Worse perhaps is that
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corporatism, although defined by most of its students as an amalgam of institutional and
behavioural features, is not properly elaborated in operational terms that are suitable for sys-
tematic comparative research and conducive to valid and reliable results. In the next section
we will therefore develop a conceptualisation of corporatism that allows for valid and reli-
able measurement and can be used to develop a heuristic framework to empirically analyse
corporatist intermediation as an effect-producing variable.
3 Corporatism as a mode of concerted policy formation
Following Keman (1996, 1999) and Molina and Rhodes (2002), corporatism is a mode of
policy-making that involves the government and the relevant socio-economic actors: trade
unions and employers’ organisations; rather than a systemic, structural or functional phenom-
enon characterised by (corporatist) institutions, cooperation and consensus (between trade
unions and employers’ organisations), unionisation, and social democratic government.2
The conceptualisation of corporatism as a mode of policy-making implies an analysis
of the behavioural patterns of the actors within the institutional context in which the
policy-making processes is embedded. In this regard much is owed to Katzenstein (1985) who
proposes a conceptualisation of corporatism as a political mechanism to cope with conflict
as a consequence of socio-economic change, by incorporating government and organised
interest groups in the formation and implementation of incomes policy.
Besides Keman and Molina and Rhodes, other researchers as well have developed
actor oriented conceptions of corporatism. For example, Hartog (1999) and van Waarden
(2002) emphasise the aspect of co-operation and collective decision-making between party
government, trade unions and employers’ organisations on the formation and implementa-
tion of socio-economic policies in corporatist countries, as do Lehmbruch (1979) and Siaroff
(1999). However, these concepts remain to a large extent static or they lack institutional
context.
Essential therefore is that the conceptualisation of corporatism stresses both the rela-
tive autonomy (institutions) and the mutual instrumentalisation (behavioural patterns) of
the actors involved. The rules of the game ensure both the relative autonomy of the actors,
and the possibility (not the necessity or inevitability) for mutual instrumentalisation, i.e.
joint or interdependent action. Employers’ organisations and trade unions have the option to
co-operate with each other and with the government. The government can also opt to follow
a corporatist strategy of policy formation and implementation or rather choose to unilaterally
impose policies on employers’ organisations or trade unions. The interactions between the
relevant actors are by and large the result of the extant rules of the game (institutions) and the
perceived need to co-operate in order to achieve optimal outcomes for all through policy for-
mation (mutual instrumentalisation). In other words: corporatist interest intermediation and
the resulting policy formation is conceptualised as patterned variations of institutionalised
behaviour between the core actors. The extent to which this game is played is thus not only
dependent on the institutional context but also on the role performance of all actors involved.
Their behaviour (choice of action) is crucial for the actual working of corporatism (Scharpf
1998). Hence, the measurement of this behaviour over time is essential for the construction
of a valid and reliable indicator that can be used to link theory to empirical evidence in
comparative analysis.
2 For example, Jessop (1979), Schmitter (1979), Panitch (1981), Marks (1986), Crépaz (1992).
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The autonomy of the actors is neither unlimited nor unbound. Both the formal rule of
law and the more informal institutional setting of consultation and negotiation between the
societal actors set constraints. Based on the formal rule of law, ultimately the outcome of
the corporatist strategy has to be sanctioned by parliament. Theoretically, therefore, consti-
tutional government can make and change the rules of the game. There are, however, the
informal rules and practices that societal actors have to develop as they go, to be able to play
the game: the so-called logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1989). These informal
rules can only function if actors keep to them and that may be dependent on power relations
in terms of veto points and available sanctions (Keman 1999; Olsen 1998). Nevertheless,
within a setting of embedded co-operative policy-making, be it between political parties in a
system of proportional representation, or between party government and interest groups in a
corporatist setting, the options of open conflict or outright defection are much less accessible
than within more pluralist settings (Woldendorp 2005, pp. 41–44; Strøm et al. 2003).
In our view, this interdependence of actors can be best understood by combining a Rational
Choice-approach with some of the insights gained from the New Institutionalism-approach:
Rational Institutionalism (Keman 1996, 1999; see also Shepsle 1995; Scharpf 1998; Peters
2000). The New Institutionalism-approach points to the constraints on the actions of the dif-
ferent actors within the institutions. The feasibility of their actions motivated by self-interest
is limited or defined by their institutional room to manoeuvre. Each actor’s feasible self-
interest is translated into a set of options aimed at attaining an optimal solution within the
specific socio-political situation. The room to manoeuvre is heavily dependent on the styles
of decision-making developed within the institutions. Therefore, institutions should be seen
as intermediating variables in which a trade-off or even a pay-off of intentions and feasible
options can take place, in such a way that zero-sum games are the exception rather than the
rule. A positive-sum game is feasible, given the knowledge and information each actor has
about its needs and interests and those of the other actors, which translate into a feasible set of
options for each actor, and the institutional constraints that limit each actor’s ability to defect.
Through the recurrent process of consultation and negotiation, this fosters the occurrence of
a logic of accommodation, instead of a logic of conflict (Molina and Rhodes 2002; see also
Czada 1998).
Democratic government plays a vital part in this process. As Keman (1999) shows, in
the corporatist arena all actors usually have comparable lists of needs and interests. But
these needs and interests differ in importance attached to them by the actors involved. And
usually trade unions and employers’ organisations have quite conflicting rank orders of pref-
erences. This implies that government has to mediate and encourage the occurrence of viable
agreements (compromises) to avoid conflict and promote consensus.3 At the same time, the
government itself is also an actor with a comparable list of interests in a certain rank order.
To reach agreement between all three actors, it will be necessary to reorder and thus adjust
each actor’s list of interests on the basis of potentially shared interests. In the process of
negotiation, with all corresponding conflicts, it becomes clear whether or not this reordering
may occur and an agreement (compromise) can be reached, and sanctioned by parliament.
This agreement is what Shepsle (1995, pp. 283–284) defines as a structure induced equilib-
rium. This type of Rational Institutionalism assumes that preferences are not given but can
be altered during negotiations and, thereby, produce an equilibrium in the end.
3 To quote Teulings and Hartog (1998, p. 297): “corporatism requires political management” (their emphasis);
or Keman (1999, p. 265): “in the case of corporatism, the room to manoeuvre (of trade unions and employers’
organisations—authors) is by and large defined by party-government” (see also Molina and Rhodes 2002;
Hartog 1999 and van Waarden 2002).
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We propose a conceptualisation of corporatism that is, first of all, seen as a process. This
process is at the very heart of corporatist interest intermediation vis-à-vis socio-
economic policy formation. This approach entails by definition a tripartite arrangement
between government, employers’ organisations and trade unions. Each actor avails of certain
power resources (relative autonomy), the exercise of which is more or less of an interde-
pendent nature. Finally, the interactions in terms of behaviour (negotiations and eventual
compliance) can be interpreted as a (strategic) game. Patterned behaviour and institutional
arrangement determine how the game is played and what the eventual result is.
To operationalise this approach we developed a heuristic framework that in a systematic
and comparable fashion allows for an actor related and case based investigation of corporatism
as a process.
4 Towards a heuristic framework for comparing corporatism
In this section the behavioural patterns of the relevant actors during negotiations on policy-
making will be developed by taking the formation and implementation of Dutch incomes
policy as a point of reference (i.e. connecting concept to indicators). The aim is to be able
to empirically investigate and analyse the interplay between institutions and actors and the
relationship between process and outcome of negotiations on policy-making over time. Two
dimensions will be elaborated: government’s behaviour vis-à-vis the social partners and the
behavioural pattern of the social partners themselves.
4.1 Government strategy
The strategy of the government in incomes policy involves two stages: the process of nego-
tiations between trade unions and employers’ organisations, and the implementation of
the (non)agreements eventually reached. In both stages government may intervene, or not,
depending on the preferences of the government of the day as expressed in its annual bud-
get (policy agenda). Logically and empirically, four types of government strategy can be
observed:
I=Passive strategy Government remains passive and abstains from direct inter-
vention in the negotiations between the other actors involved
(policy formation). Government neither intervenes in bi-lateral
negotiations nor (re)directs its eventual outcomes (policy imple-
mentation).
II=Co-operative strategy Government restricts its interventions to the facilitation of nego-
tiations between trade unions and employers’ organisations
(policy formation). If government intervenes in the outcome
of the negotiations, it is not expected to go against the outcome
of those negotiations (policy implementation).
III=Congruent strategy Government actively intervenes by means of policy propos-
als during negotiations between trade unions and employers’
organisations. The government’s interventions are aimed at
facilitating agreement between all three actors involved (pol-
icy formation). Government may intervene in the process by
means of policy proposals, but is not expected to go against the
outcome of the negotiations (policy implementation).
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IV=Guiding strategy Government puts its own policy preferences first. Trade unions and
employers’ organisations are required to accept the government’s
agenda as the basis for incomes policy (policy formation). Govern-
ment implements its own policy without much regard for agendas
of the social partners or the outcomes of the negotiations (formation
and implementation).
Type II and III are regarded to represent typically corporatist strategies. In both types, the
government intends to accommodate the process of negotiations between the social partners.
The difference between type II and III is that in type II the government tries to facilitate
negotiations by offering various (dis)incentives, but leaves formation and implementation
of incomes policy largely to the actors involved and is flexible as regards the pursuit of its
preferences. In type III the government actively intervenes in the formation of incomes pol-
icy with its own (joint) policy proposals, and may actively intervene in the outcome of the
negotiations as well (implementation).
Types I and IV are considered to be non-corporatist strategies because the underlying logic
of behaviour is not consensus driven. In type I, government refrains from any intervention
at all. In type IV, government seeks to implement its own policy agenda disregarding the
preferences of the social partners.
4.2 Styles of decision-making of trade unions and employers’ organisation
Since we are dealing with corporatist interest intermediation, it concerns by definition trade
unions and employers’ organisations. The style of decision-making refers to the strategy
with which these actors try to reach the goals that represent their respective preferences
(policy agendas—see Appendix). The common denominator of corporatism is that all actors
involved are willing to arrive at a common agenda based on exchanging preferences. As
Scharpf (1987) has shown, the co-ordination of agendas may indeed involve co-operative
negotiation in a corporatist setting, but not always, nor necessarily. Derived from a game
theoretic perspective Scharpf (1998, p. 50) distinguishes three strategies within corporatist
institutions: confrontation, bargaining, and problem solving.
Confrontation refers to interactions in which “winning, or the defeat of the other side,
is the paramount goal” (ibid.: 50). One of the actors assumes its power base as sufficient
and its preferences as not negotiable. In game theoretic terms: the first move is according to
a Chicken game producing a zero-sum outcome. Bargaining refers to interactions in which
“participants are exclusively motivated by their egotistic self-interest and the typical outcome
is a compromise” (ibid.: 50). This strategy is known as the Tit-for-tat logic (Axelrod 1984).
Problem solving, finally, “implies the pursuit of common goals and the common search for
an optimal solution” (ibid.: 50). All actors take to a strategy that is directed by the assumption
that the optimal result reflects an equilibrium that cannot be improved.
In real life actors have often shared and conflicting interests. Therefore, actors will be
ambivalent; they will be drawn to co-operation and to conflict at the same time. Yet, this
ambivalence also creates the possibility that interests and issues may be redefined through
conflict, bargaining and problem solving. Hence the expectation that in real life negotiation
processes between social partners may alternate between competition (confrontation or bar-
gaining) and co-operation (problem solving). Based on these assumptions, three modes of
behaviour or interdependent styles of decision-making can be distinguished:
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A=Confrontation Preferences of the societal actors involved differ substantially and
thus there is little common ground to reach agreement. Negotiations
are either characterised by defection (from negotiations) or by open
conflicts (strikes, lockouts and the like). Both actors are on a collision
course.
B=Bargaining Preferences of the actors feature the same issues and concerns, but
with differing emphases with regard to desired solutions and policies
(means-end problematic). Negotiations may be protracted and result
in deadlocks. Actors may resort to threats (e.g., to defect), but—
assuming rational behaviour—eventually reaching an agreement is
the shared goal.
C=Problem solving Preferences of the actors feature the same issues and concerns and
share common ground with regard to desired solutions and policies
making exchange and compromise feasible. Although negotiations
can be characterised by temporary deadlocks, the social partners will
continue to strive for the best joint optimal outcome.
These three styles of decision-making can be rank ordered in terms of strategic options that
range from open confrontation through bargaining to problem solving by means of regulatory
policy formation. In summary: our theory guided concept of corporatism is constructed by
relating the substance of the policy process to behavioural aspects embedded in the institu-
tional context. The next step is to develop the matrix that enables the researcher to investigate
this empirically.
4.3 Government strategy and styles of decision-making: process and outcome
All actors, in this case: party government, and trade unions and employers’ organisations,
have various strategies and styles of decision-making at their disposal with which to conduct
negotiations (i.e. on incomes policy). Obviously each actor can change its strategy and related
style of decision-making during the annual bargaining process on incomes policy. In other
words, it is a dynamic process until a result in terms of policy formation and implementation
is reached. This is in our example an agreement between the actors involved, but obviously
a non-agreement or non-implementation of the agreement struck is also a result.
This means that in every cycle of negotiations 12 (4 × 3) options are available and that
any possible combination thereof can be theoretically accounted for, based on the (changes
in) strategy and style of decision-making employed by the actors involved (see Table 1). But
not only changes in strategy and style of decision-making can be accounted for, the same
goes for consistent government strategies and styles of decision-making. As an instrument of
analysis this heuristic framework therefore is suitable for investigating empirical variations
of the process of negotiations (here: on incomes policy) across time (and across systems).
Table 1 shows the 12 options possible and demonstrates how, during negotiations, trade
unions and employers’ organisations may employ different strategies, resulting in different
styles of decision-making. A combination of styles in which one of the parties opts for con-
frontation (A) and the other for either bargaining (B) or problem solving (C) will always
result in a situation of confrontation, because one of the actors puts its (self) interest first and
refuses to co-operate. A combination of styles in which one of the actors opts for bargaining
(B) and the other for problem solving (C) will always result in a situation of bargaining,
because one of the parties is intent upon resolving the differences between parties, and the
other party is not bent on confrontation (Woldendorp 2005, pp. 277–278).
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Table 1 Government strategy and styles of decision-making: process and outcome
Styles of
decision-making
Government strategy
I=Passive II=Co-operative III=Congruent IV = Guiding
A+A, B,
C=Confrontation
(A)
IA: Not corporatist IIA: Corporatist IIIA: Corporatist IVA: Not corporatist
B+B,
C=Bargaining
(B)
IB: Not corporatist IIB: Corporatist IIB: Corporatist IVB: Not corporatist
C+C=Problem
solving (C)
IC: Not corporatist
(quasi-corporatist)
IIC: Corporatist IIIC: Corporatist IVC: Not corporatist
(corporativist)
Source: Woldendorp (2005, p. 71)
The strategic dimension in Table 1 elaborates the options of government: government
strategies II (co-operative) and III (congruent) represent a corporatist government strategy
towards a shared incomes policy. Styles of decision-making may range from confrontation
to problem solving. Cells IIA and IIIA represent steps in the bargaining process or outcomes
in which government pursues a corporatist strategy, but trade unions and employers’ organ-
isations opt for confrontation. Notwithstanding the government’s corporatist strategy, the
outcome in terms of concluding an agreement on incomes policy is not successful. Cells
IIB and IIIB represent steps in the bargaining process or outcomes in which the government
pursues a corporatist strategy and trade unions and employers’ organisations are willing to
bargain. Although the government’s strategy is corporatist, the outcomes in terms of con-
cluding an agreement on incomes policy may not always be successful. Cells IIC and IIIC
represent steps in the bargaining process or outcomes in which the government pursues a
corporatist strategy, and trade unions and employers’ organisations are most co-operative. In
this situation, the outcome in terms of concluding an agreement on incomes policy is usually
successful. In other words, in case of a corporatist government strategy, the outcome in terms
of an agreement on incomes policy is determined by the style of decision-making of trade
unions and employers’ organisations.
Government strategies I and IV, the passive and the guiding strategy, respectively, are not
considered to be corporatist. Cells IA, IB and IC cover those situations in which the govern-
ment remains passive in the bargaining process or in the outcome, regardless of the chosen
style of decision-making by trade unions and employers’ organisations. Cell IC may seem to
signify a corporatist incomes policy from the perspective of styles of decision-making. Trade
unions and employers’ organisations display a high degree of co-operation with each other.
However, this would be a contradiction in terms, for in our conceptualization of corporatism
a passive government strategy can not be considered as a corporatist incomes policy. This
cell represents steps in the bargaining process or outcomes that can also occur in a pluralist
setting. We have therefore labelled this situation as quasi corporatist because government
has no corporatist intention. The government, which is institutionally required as an actor
involved, leaves incomes policy formation to trade unions and employers’ organisations.4
Cells IVA, IVB, and IVC cover the situations in which the government imposes its
own incomes policy package in bargaining process or outcome, regardless of the style of
decision-making employed by trade unions and employers’ organisations. Cell IVC
4 Other authors do not agree. They consider bilateral agreements between social partners, regardless of
government strategy, to be corporatist (e.g., Siaroff 1999; Kenworthy 2003).
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represents an example of what may be called corporativism (state led or authoritarian
corporatism—Schmitter 1979). The main point is again that the government does not have
any corporatist intention. The government imposes its own incomes policy on trade unions
and employers’ organisations. And trade unions and employers’ organisations happen to
agree on that policy, or to comply with that policy without any resistance.
The corporatist outcomes may be defined as the outcomes in which the government seeks
to facilitate trade unions and employers’ organisations to find a structure induced equilibrium
(or in the Dutch case, a Central Agreement on incomes policy) that cannot be improved for
any actor (Shepsle 1995, pp. 283–284). The substance of the outcome can be explained in
terms of a reordering of the lists of needs of each actor that is expressed in their respective
agendas. In our conception government is the pivotal actor in this corporatist process of inter-
est intermediation by guiding the reordering of the preferences of all involved. Of course this
does not imply that a corporatist strategy of government is by definition successful in terms
of agreements on incomes policy. In fact, there are only four outcomes feasible:
• A bipartite Central Agreement between trade unions and employers’ organisations.
• A tripartite Central Agreement between the government, trade unions and employers’
organisations.
• No Central Agreement.
• A government directed or imposed incomes policy.
This means that the typology presented in Table 1 is exhaustive; all empirical combinations
across time (and systems) can be accounted for in substantial terms. To put it differently: this
heuristic framework represents a mode of analysis to compare the various processes as they
emerge in reality. It enables the researcher to develop a nominal classification describing not
only all possible situations, but by linking these to the actual outcomes, they can also be
developed into a theory driven ranking order (from a non-corporatist to a typical corporatist
performance; or from consensual to conflictual behaviour).
The advantage is that—contrary to going up Sartori’s (1970) ladder of generality—the
essential information at the case level is preserved, nor has the researcher to resort to radial
categorisations or family resemblances (Collier and Mahon 1993).5 The latter procedure is
sensitive to the researcher’s choice and easily leads to invalid and less reliable data (Landman
2004; Dogan and Pelassy 1990).
However, unlike a typology, the categories (cells) in Table 1 are empirically not mutually
exclusive. The four outcomes in terms of agreements on incomes policy in The Netherlands
may be reached through a variety of stages and outcomes of the bargaining process, thereby
showing both the process and variation over time. And this is precisely the strength of our
heuristic framework: it helps to categorize the empirical information systematically in a
comparative mode, and it allows for a dynamic interpretation of the process under scrutiny.
Whatever the level of comparison—countries, annual change, units within a polity, etc.—it
produces an optimal trade-off between conceptual validity and empirical reliability.
In the next section we will demonstrate this by applying the framework to the process
of incomes policy formation in The Netherlands. The units of observation are the annual
5 Sartori points to the trade-off between comparability and unique features of comparable cases. We argue that
there is no trade-off if one uses a multi-faceted operationalisation of the underlying concept that travels without
unduly stretching. Collier and Mahon’s solution is to use either resemblances of the various empirical units
of observation (having more in common than other phenomena; they call this an empirical family) or radial
categorization (relaxing the shared conceptual attributes of a phenomenon). Although to some extent helpful
both imply a loss of information. We claim that our heuristic framework based on a theory-cum-conceptual
classification does not loose information and remains truly comparative.
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negotiations, the units of variation the actors involved (as presented in Table 1), and the typol-
ogy itself—ordering the actual process—is used to classify the empirical information regard-
ing the behaviour of the actors in relation to the eventual outcome: a Central Agreement (or
not). We claim that this method is less sensitive to Dutch-centrist explanations (intra-case bias)
and provides comparable information on the formation and implementation of Dutch incomes
policy. The underlying logic and elaboration of this heuristic framework makes it—so we
argue—a suitable instrument of analysis for investigating the politics of policy making across
time and across countries that is beyond the application to Dutch incomes policy as such.
5 Investigating Dutch incomes policy and corporatism
In Table 2 the results of our investigation are presented. It concerns a sample of the 36 units
of observation (i.e. the annual cycle of negotiations between 1965 and 2000). This selec-
tion covers the observed variation in process and outcome of government strategies and
styles of decision-making of trade unions and employers’ organisations presented in Table 1.
The different units of observation and related categorisations will be discussed in order to
demonstrate that it is indeed possible to capture all variations, changes and outcomes.
In 1965, the process was dominated by type III strategy of government (congruent) and
type A style of decision-making (confrontation). The government tried to broker at least a
bipartite, but preferably a tripartite (Central) Agreement between trade unions, employers’
organisations and the government. Government actively intervened in the negotiations and
tried to facilitate agreement by offering a choice of various policy packages on incomes pol-
icy to trade unions and employers’ organisations. A deadlock was resolved by government
based on a new incomes policy package on which social partners could both agree, albeit
reluctantly. Therefore the outcome is classified as positive (Central Agreement) and—due to
government behaviour—the style of decision-making changed to bargaining (B).
In 1967, despite reaching no agreement, trade unions and employers’ organisations both
rejected a government intervention to break the deadlock. Nevertheless, the government
decided to intervene with a binding incomes policy package. This is a typical example of the
bargaining style that was not modified during the process. Corporatism as a mechanism did
apparently not function and a change of strategy did not occur.
In 1974, after the rank-and-file of the employers’ organisations rejected a provisional
bipartite Central Agreement that was brokered by the government, the (first) oil crisis
occurred. The (left-to-centre coalition) government reacted with emergency legislation,
enabling it to enforce temporary macroeconomic policies. Social partners subsequently failed
again to reach an agreement (moving between style A and B). The emergency legislation
Table 2 Sequence of
government strategies and styles
of decision-making in selected
years of Dutch incomes policy
formation and implementation
Source: Woldendorp (2005,
p. 102; 274 ff.)
Year Opening Changes Concluding Agreement
1965 IIIA IIIB Yes
1967 IVB IVB No
1974 IIA IIB-IIA-IVB-IIB IVB No
1983 IIIA IVB-IC-IVB IC Yes
1987 IIB IIIB Yes
1992 IA IA No
2000 IIB IIB No
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was then expanded with a binding wage measure that, as the earlier package, was carefully
designed to take into account the agendas of both trade unions and employers’ organisa-
tions (moving between strategy II and IV). This year is an example of how to systematically
classify a complex interaction process until the eventual result. Almost all strategic options
were used as well as all available behavioural patterns. Nevertheless, our heuristic framework
could capture all changes.
In 1983, under strong pressure by the incoming government, an agreement was struck
between trade unions and employers’ organisations. For social partners, the aim was to keep
the government out of incomes policy in the market sector after a series of binding measures
during 1980, 1981 and 1982 (hence moving between style B and C). For the government, the
substantive aim was wage moderation in the market sector. The agreement resulted in wage
moderation in the market sector. Through all linking mechanisms6 this moderation extended
to the (semi-) public sector as well. Therefore, in the end the government refrained from
(binding) intervention in incomes policy in the market sector (moving between strategy I and
IV). As in 1974, this year is an example how complex processes of interaction, including the
result, can be classified.
With some difficulty, in 1987 the government succeeded in getting trade unions and
employers’ organisations to participate in a tripartite Central Agreement. This is expressed
in the strategy change from II to III whereas the style of decision-making remained the same
(B). The substance of this agreement was that parties renewed their commitment to previous
bipartite and tripartite agreements on (elements of) employment policies. Employers’ organi-
sations determined the outcome with respect to working hours, while trade unions succeeded
in countering the government’s reduction of the level of social security benefits. Employers
agreed to top these up (a typical tit-for-tat outcome).
In 1992, all three parties went their separate ways. Central negotiations did not take place.
Decentral negotiations resulted in bilateral compromises between trade unions and employ-
ers’ organisations in which trade unions managed to get their way (A). Government did not
intervene in incomes policy in the market sector (hence: I-passive). All in all this situation
can be classified as non-corporatist.
In 2000, consultations between the government, trade unions and employers’ organisa-
tions on the central level can be characterised as an exchange of not too different points of
view on incomes policy. Neither party pressed for a Central Agreement. Decentral negotia-
tions proceeded without much difficulty (B—bargaining) due to a booming economy and a
corporatist government policy that boosted buying power of the lower paid and included a
partial linkage between the market sector and the (semi-) public sector (II—facilitating).
This brief discussion of the process and outcome of negotiations on the formation and
implementation of Dutch incomes policy in a selected number of years demonstrates that the
heuristic framework elaborated from a conceptual inquiry of corporatism allows for captur-
ing and understanding the process and outcome in terms of government strategy and styles of
decision-making of trade unions and employers’ organisations. This overview also shows that
the outcome in terms of agreements is indeed reached through different stages and outcomes
of the policy process, both corporatist and non-corporatist. In other words, the application of
6 The linkage between market sector and (semi-) public sector came in force in 1974 with the policy package
of the government Den Uyl (CDA-PvdA). Wages, benefits and pensions in the (semi-) public became linked to
the statutory minimum wage (1969) and to the average rise in collectively agreed wages in the market sector.
In 1979 this linkage became statutory (Law on Adjustment Mechanisms). Consequently, incomes policy in
the market sector had a direct effect on incomes in the (semi-) public sector and on the government’s budget
(deficit). From 1983, the linkage was put on hold; since 1992 it is conditional (Law on Conditional Indexation)
(Visser and Hemerijck 1997, 132 ff.).
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this heuristic framework to Dutch incomes policy-making makes it possible to systematically
investigate the interactions between actors, the interplay between actors and institutions, and
the variation over time.
Since the results are not static but show variation simplistic interpretations are avoided and
this helps to analyse the relationship between input and output (opening and closing strategy
in view of the styles of decision-making that have occurred). This examination of Dutch
incomes policy also demonstrates that the underlying logic of inquiry induces the researcher
to contemplate on the variation observed: similar processes lead to divergent outcomes and
vice versa. Therefore, we claim that the application of this heuristic framework demonstrates
its usefulness for research.7 In the next section we argue that our method can be applied
to other policy areas within one polity, as well as to comparative research across time and
systems.
6 Discussion: implications for cross-national comparative research
The implications for comparative research of the heuristic framework developed above are
twofold. Firstly, it can be used for a more dynamic in-depth analysis of the strategic behaviour
within the institutional context of a polity when it comes to the formation and implementation
of socio-economic types of policy. It goes almost without saying that our approach is open
for cross-time and cross-system analysis. Such an analysis will yield a series of consecutive
units of analysis (e.g., annual formation and implementation of policy), that can in turn be
used for the comparison of the dynamics of policy-making that involve party government
and the relevant actors (in our case: trade unions and employers’ organisations). A cross-
system comparison of the policy process in various countries based on this framework can
and will contribute to alleviating the existing methodological trade-off between comparing
multiple polities and researching a single country, by combining elements of both research
methods: comparing multiple cases (across time and across systems) based on evidence that
is systematically derived from thick, or qualitative description that allows for externally valid
analytical results (Pennings et al. 2006).
Secondly, with some adaptations, this heuristic framework could also be used to inves-
tigate and compare the formation and implementation of policies in other policy areas than
incomes policy. To apply the heuristic framework it is necessary to identify the relevant polit-
ical and societal actors in these policy areas as well as their agendas; to identify the relevant
formal institutions; and finally to reconstruct the process of negotiations on the formation and
implementation of these policies as well as the time frame involved. The application of our
method allows for an analysis of the behaviour of the relevant actors in terms of government
strategy and styles of decision-making of societal actors. And that analysis can be used for
both case studies within a polity (e.g., the EU, a country or a sub-national unit) as well as
7 The empirical analysis of Dutch incomes policy between 1965 and 2000 based on this heuristic framework
offers the opportunity to resolve various issues regarding corporatism and the Dutch case (Woldendorp 2005).
For instance, the research shows that in a clear majority of the years governments in The Netherlands preferred
to open negotiations on incomes policy with a corporatist government strategy. However, only in a slight major-
ity of those years governments also concluded with a corporatist government strategy. The preferred style of
decision-making of social partners appears to have been the bargaining style (B) instead of the co-operative
problem solving style (C). And although corporatist government strategies and Central Agreements did go
together more often, in a large majority of the years, with or without corporatist government strategies, no
Central Agreement could be reached due to this bargaining style (B) of decision-making preferred by social
partners.
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for cross-national comparison of policy-making in other policy sectors (e.g., labour market
or social welfare).
In conclusion, we contend that the heuristic framework elaborated in this paper is a prom-
ising instrument of empirical analysis that can bridge the gap between qualitative and quan-
titative research and between many cases-few variables and few cases-many variables.
Appendix
Empirical investigation of the process of negotiations on Dutch incomes policy
The annual presentation of the government’s budget is the starting point for the cycle of
central (national) negotiations on incomes policy. These negotiations involve the govern-
ment, and the peak organisations of trade unions and employers’ organisations. Chronolog-
ically, four stages in this process can be distinguished (van Drimmelen and van Hulst 1987,
pp. 34–35).
Each year, at the end of September, the government presents the budget for the coming
year (policy agenda), based on the Macro-Economische Verkenningen of that year (MEV=
Macroeconomic Forecasts) issued by the Dutch Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB).8
Both the prognoses of economic developments by the CPB and the government’s proposed
(budget) policies based on those forecasts are important inputs and constraints for the nego-
tiations.
In October or November the trade unions publish their programmes (policy agendas) for
the coming year, based on extensive internal discussions. These usually consist of a num-
ber of very specific, concrete demands, combined with a number of rather more flexible
demands, and are a general framework for negotiations, both on the central and on the decen-
tral level. Either in response, or simultaneously, employers’ organisations also publishes their
programmes (policy agendas).
Next, negotiations start in the Foundation of Labour.9 There may be simultaneous consul-
tations going on in the Social and Economic Council (SER)10 that have a bearing on these
negotiations. Usually, the government gets involved as well. These central negotiations may
or may not result in a Central Agreement.
Regardless of the outcome of the central negotiations—a Central Agreement, no Central
Agreement or government intervention—between December and June decentral negotiations
between employers and trade unions on collective contracts on the industry and company
level take place. In the absence of a Central Agreement or government intervention, these are
8 The CPB is a government agency, but, similar to the Central Bank, to a large extent independent from the
government of the day. It provides the government with economic forecasts.
9 The Foundation of Labour was created after top-level negotiations between unions and employers’ organ-
isations during World War II and is also the organisation in which the annual central negotiations on wages
and other terms of employment between trade unions and employers’ organisations take place.
10 The Social and Economic Council was instituted by law in 1950. Two-thirds of its members are nomi-
nated by recognised organisations of workers and employers. The government appoints the remainder. These
so-called crown members are called independent experts, but reflect to a certain extent the major political par-
ties. By virtue of their offices, the directors of the CPB and the Dutch Central Bank are also crown members.
The statutory powers of the Council are limited to advising the government. Until 1995 the government was
legally obliged to ask for a recommendation about all important socio-economic policy measures. In 1995 this
was abolished. Nevertheless, successive governments continued to ask the Council’s recommendation on all
major proposals for socio-economic policies. The Council’s recommendations are not binding.
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based on the policy agendas issued in October or November. These negotiations eventually
result in collective contracts, covering any period between one and two-and-a-half years.
Since 1984, the process of negotiations has somewhat changed. Apart from the cycle of
negotiations identified above, government and trade unions and employers’ organisations
also meet for consultation each Spring and each Autumn. The Spring Consultation may take
place any time between the end of January and the end of July of any given year; the Autumn
Consultation after announcing the budget for the next year. The Spring Consultation gives
the government the opportunity to sound out the reactions of trade unions and employers’
organisations to government policies that may be proposed in next year’s budget in Septem-
ber. The Autumn Consultation is used to persuade trade unions and employers’ organisations
to come to terms, based on the budget announced for next year. The substance of these con-
sultations may vary from a very brief exchange of points of view to protracted negotiations,
which may or may not result in a Central Agreement.
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